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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Letter dated 10 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 8 December 2001 from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Ravan **Farhâdi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 10 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith an article in *The New York Times* dated Saturday, 8 December 2001, by Mr. Douglas Frantz.

The article contains a valuable sequential summary of facts bearing historic significance on the situation in Afghanistan.

(*Signed*) A. **Abdullah**
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

Appendix

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2001

Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only Hesitantly

By DOUGLAS FRANTZ

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Dec. 7 — One month after the Pakistan government agreed to end its support of the Taliban, its intelligence agency was still providing safe passage for weapons and ammunition to arm them, according to Western and Pakistani officials.

On Oct. 8 and again on Oct. 12, Pakistani border guards at a dusty checkpoint in the Khyber Pass waved on convoys headed into Afghanistan. Western intelligence officials said that under the trucks' tarpaulins were rifles ammunition and rocket-propelled grenade launchers for Taliban fighters.

Pakistan's premier spying agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, had long provided safe passage to armadas of truckers and smugglers who supplied a mountain of weapons to the Taliban war machine. But the policy was supposed to have changed in September after a Washington ultimatum to Pakistan.

A senior Pakistani intelligence official acknowledged that the Oct. 8 shipment did contain arms for the Taliban, but he said that it was the last officially sanctioned delivery and that the Pakistanis have since been living up to their commitment to the Americans.

Even around that time, there were signs of a change. Pakistani military advisers were withdrawn from Afghanistan over the following weeks,

Continued on Page B4

Continued From Page A1

a move that Western intelligence officials say may have been a crucial factor in the surprisingly swift collapse of Taliban forces when confronted by the Northern Alliance.

"We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs," said a Western diplomat who has monitored the region for many years.

Nonetheless, Inter-Services Intelligence, or I.S.I., remains what many describe as a state within a state, with independent, and worrying, political tendencies.

"Power remains in the hands of a powerful group of 'jihadi' generals who are outside the government apparatus, but have tentacles in government," the former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, said in an interview.

Ms. Bhutto is hardly an impartial observer. Now living in self-imposed exile in Dubai to avoid corruption charges at home, she blames I.S.I. for conspiring to topple her second government in 1996, in part because she refused to fully back the Taliban.

But her view is shared by many in Pakistan's intelligence and diplomatic ranks, where the strong sense is that Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the president, must begin a broader purge if he hopes to loosen the grip of elements in I.S.I. who, even now, are loyal to the Taliban.

One of the agency's staunchly Islamist intelligence directors was Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, who headed the agency in the late 1980's and remains an influential figure within it.

"It will not be so easy for officers to set aside their beliefs and change sides," General Gul, who is retired, said in a recent interview.

General Gul remains a supporter of the Taliban and he denounced the Americans for condemning them and Osama bin Laden without providing any proof of guilt.

"Osama bin Laden is a sensitive man and he had nothing to do with the attacks on America," he said. "You Americans will have to support the Taliban one day. They are not going to go away. They are integral, organic, historic."

The agency and General Musharraf had specifically agreed to end support for the Taliban in a series of meetings and phone conversations right after Sept. 11.

But Pakistani intelligence officers and military advisers contined helping the Taliban at least into October, providing tactical advice and helping to strengthen fortifications around Kandahar, the southern stronghold of the Taliban, diplomats and intelligence officials said.

To reverse this, on Oct. 7 — the day the Americans started bombing Afghanistan — General Musharraf took the strong — and risky — step of removing the director of I.S.I., Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who is regarded as pro-Taliban. He replaced him with a moderate, Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq.

Speaking of General Musharraf, a senior American official said: "He knows he has got cells of Taliban people in intelligence and he's got a rule that he is going to kick anyone out who has been there four or five years because you don't know where the cells are."

To help the purge, American officials are questioning former Pakistani officials to compile a list of intelligence officers and other government officials whose pro-Islamic sentiments make them suspect, according to people who said they were interviewed as part of the search.

For many within the intelligence service, helping the Taliban was as much a religious duty as a military one. Some of the officers had trained Afghan fighters against the Soviets when I.S.I. funneled $3 billion in American funds into Afghanistan.

For seven years, Pakistan's Islamic government had been the Taliban's main sponsor, alongside Mr. bin Laden. It provided military equipment, recruiting assistance, training and tactical advice that enabled the band of village mullahs and their adherents to take control of Afghanistan and turn it into a haven for terrorists.

The impact was considerable because, after fattening its coffers with American money, I.S.I. was able to tilt the battle in Afghanistan.

Nasirullah Khan Babar, a retired army general who was Pakistan's interior minister in 1994, packed his country's diplomatic posts in Afghanistan with intelligence agents to ensure that the Taliban got the help they needed.

"They were I.S.I. people who had been in the jihad and the Afghans had a lot of respect for them," General Babar said in a recent interview at his home in Peshawar.

One of those agents was Amir Sultan Tarar, who was designated consul general in Herat, in the west. He used the code name Colonel Imam, which adopts a religious title and was a common nom de guerre among I.S.I. officers.

He befriended the Taliban's spiritual leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, and provided tactical advice to his forces while also serving as a conduit for arms and money, according to former Pakistani intelligence officials. Like many of the Pakistanis, he donned a turban and grew a beard to blend in with his clients.

As the Taliban captured more territory and enforced their harsh brand of Islam on larger swaths of

Robert Nickelsberg



Associated Press

President Pervez Musharraf, left, has ended Pakistan's support of the Taliban. Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, former head of intelligence, is pro-Taliban.

the population, concern began to grow in Pakistan and Washington.

Even before the Taliban were formed, the United States was warning Pakistan about I.S.I.'s conduct in Afghanistan, saying that it risked being listed as a sponsor of terrorism and losing access to international financial assistance. That warning, which also referred to I.S.I. activity in Kashmir, a territory claimed by India and Pakistan, came in a letter from President George Bush in 1992, according to a former Pakistani official who saw it.

By early 1996, when Ms. Bhutto was serving her second term as prime minister, she became concerned about Pakistan's closeness to the Taliban and about I.S.I.'s control over Afghan policy, she said in the interview.

A meeting of senior government officials was called to discuss pulling back from the Taliban. Gen. Jehangir Karamat, chief of the armed forces, argued that the agency should stop its activities inside Afghanistan and civilian members of the government argued that if Pakistan withdrew its support, the Taliban would melt away, according to a review of minutes from the meeting provided by a participant.

But Lt. Gen. Aziz Khan, deputy director general of I.S.I. at the time, offered an impassioned defense of the Taliban: "These people will make Pakistan strong. There is nothing we need to fear from them. All they will do if they take over Afghanistan is spread pure Islam."

The intelligence service carried the day and Pakistan did not pull back. In the following months, the Taliban won impressive battlefield victories, taking Herat, Jalalabad and the capital of Kabul by the fall of 1996.

Military observers noticed a distinct change in tactics. The previously disorganized Taliban soldiers used 4-by-4 pickup trucks to outflank enemy forces and launch surprise counterattacks, employing artillery in more sophisticated ways.

American intelligence officers were certain that the Pakistanis were providing training and tactical advice to the Taliban along with money and weapons and this speculation was later supported by other evidence.

Ms. Bhutto continued to object until she was ousted from office in November 1996. She blamed I.S.I. for toppling her, saying she had angered them by her refusal to recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. There were other plausible reasons, including allegations of corruption against her and her husband.

Her military-backed replacement, Nawaz Sharif, extended the first diplomatic recognition to the Taliban in May 1997 and traveled to other Muslim countries in an attempt to persuade them to recognize the student militia. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed.

With a freer hand under Mr. Sharif, the intelligence agency dispatched military advisers to a former Soviet base in Rishikor, southwest of Kabul, to set up a training camp for volunteers sent by Pakistani religious parties to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Some of the bloodiest battles of the civil war occurred in and around Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. After losing the city once and being rebuffed another time, the Taliban made a successful push in the fall of 1998 and drove out the Northern Alliance.

Indications that Pakistan's spy agency remains a state within a state.

Western intelligence officials credit the victory to Pakistani military advisers who fought alongside the Taliban. An intercepted telephone conversation described by two Western diplomats seemed to back that assertion.

In the call, Colonel Imam, the I.S.I. officer from Herat, was heard to boast, "My boys and I are riding into Mazar-i-Sharif." By 1998, Mr. bin Laden was well established in Afghanistan after fleeing Sudan two years earlier. He and his network had set up terrorist training camps throughout the country, many of them alongside camps operated by the Taliban and I.S.I.

While the Taliban and Mr. bin Laden clearly had a close relationship, Western diplomats and foreign intelligence officers said that the links between I.S.I. and the bin Laden network were more circumspect.

Conversations intercepted by American intelligence officials contained no references to direct links between Pakistani intelligence and the network of Arabs and other foreigners who came to learn their trade in Afghanistan, said a senior government official who reviewed many of the transcripts.

After the bombings of two American embassies in East Africa in the summer of 1998 killed more than 250 people, the United States tried to find a way to pry Mr. bin Laden, who the Americans blamed for the attacks, out of Afghanistan.

In September 1999, government officials said, the director general of I.S.I., Lt. Gen. Ziauddin and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's brother, Shehbaz Sharif, were summoned to Washington. American officials told them Pakistan should force the Taliban to moderate their positions and turn over Mr. bin Laden.

When the envoys returned, Pakistani officials said, the prime minister sent General Ziauddin to Kandahar to deliver the American message to Mullah Omar, who refused.

The next month, on Oct. 12, 1999, Mr. Sharif was overthrown in a military coup. At the time, Pakistan's top military commander, General Musharraf, was on his way back from Sri Lanka. His second in command was Lt. Gen. Aziz Khan, who had defended the Taliban while working for I.S.I. He made certain that power was handed over to General Musharraf when his plane landed in Islamabad.

Again, there were many reasons for the coup, but analysts said the agency and its loyalists felt Mr. Sharif had to go partly out of fear that he might buckle to American pressure and reverse Pakistan's policy toward the Taliban.

One of the new military ruler's first acts was to cancel a top-secret mission being planned with the United States to send commandos using I.S.I. intelligence information into Afghanistan to capture Mr. bin Laden.

Despite continuing pressure from the United States and sanctions against Afghanistan by the United Nations, General Musharraf held fast to his country's support of the Taliban until Sept. 11 changed the way much of the world viewed the Afghan militia and its guest, Mr. bin Laden.

Even then, however, the entrenched elements within the intelligence agency who had backed the Afghans refused to switch sides without a fight, according to senior Pakistani officials aligned against the Taliban loyalists. That fight, they say, is still ongoing.

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Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Macroeconomic policy questions

Sustainable development and international economic cooperation

International drug control

Human rights questions

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 7 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

As a representative of the State that is chairing the statutory bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement by the heads of the CIS States members in connection with the tenth anniversary of the Commonwealth's establishment, adopted on 30 November 2001 in Moscow (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 35, 89, 95, 97, 111, 119 and 166.

(*Signed*) S. **Lavrov**

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Annex to the letter dated 7 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the heads of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in connection with the tenth anniversary of the Commonwealth's establishment

Adopted on 30 November 2001

We, the heads of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), assessing the complicated path traversed by the Commonwealth in 10 years and drawing conclusions with regard to this period, which was replete with events and was of exceptional importance, should like to point out the following.

The Commonwealth came into being during an historic turning point, when our countries were confronted with the task, unprecedented in scope, of the radical restructuring of political and economic relations in the vast Eurasian land space. The Commonwealth's achievement in ensuring that the process in which its States members attained sovereignty was conducted in an orderly manner and did not give rise to profound geopolitical turmoil cannot be doubted. It basically succeeded in maintaining the links between peoples that had come into being over the centuries, mitigating to a certain degree the social and economic consequences of the disintegration of the single State, and ensuring the institutional and the legal conditions for equitable dialogue and cooperation. CIS promoted the establishment of the independent States and the free choice by each of them of their own model of State and economic construction and their own path of integration into the world community and also became a useful instrument for solving a number of specific problems.

Far from everything that was planned has been implemented. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the Commonwealth possesses considerable positive potential, which can and must be put to use for the good of our peoples. Deepening multilateral cooperation within CIS is absolutely in keeping with the national interests of the States members and is proceeding along the same course as general world trends.

The common desire of our countries to achieve stable and consistent socio-economic development and dignified integration into the world community is a sound basis for interaction within the CIS framework. We see the Commonwealth's raison d'être in promoting the achievement of these goals through the cooperation and joint efforts of the States members. The main criterion for evaluating its activities is practical results in the task of increasing the prosperity of the citizens of our States, ensuring that they have guarantees of broad rights in the fields of education, health care, social protection, cultural development, and mutual relations — in short, really improving the lives of people.

We consider it necessary to consistently imbue the Commonwealth's work with a specific content, concentrating on those areas where joint efforts can achieve the greatest effect.

The objective interest in intensive commercial and economic cooperation — the basis for the entire range of interaction within CIS — is a result not only of the

historically interrelated nature of the economies of our countries, but also, to an increasing extent, the processes of globalization. Regional and subregional integration is opening up opportunities for jointly adapting to the political and economic realities of the contemporary world and is making it possible to effectively use the advantages of globalization, while eliminating its negative consequences, first of all, in the economic and social areas. Cooperation with regard to external-trade policies and protecting the States members' domestic markets is important in this context.

We attach key importance to the establishment of a free-trade zone in the CIS area, with account taken of the interests of all partners. This effort must lead to the gradual elimination of barriers in mutual trade, create an effective payment and settlement system, and establish a corresponding legal basis making it possible to ensure fair competition on the national markets.

The priority task of the economic cooperation is to step up integration-oriented efforts — production cooperation, investment activities and the work of joint industrial and financial structures. Particular attention will be accorded to the work of harmonizing the national foreign-trade, tax and customs legislation of the CIS States members.

Owing to their geopolitical situation, the Commonwealth countries are on the front line in the struggle against international terrorism and extremism and the transborder drug mafia, which have thrown down a challenge to the entire world. This places us before the imperative need to join efforts in order to rebuff common security threats in concert with the actions taken by the international community.

We once again declare our countries' determination to continue to carry out on a legal basis the set of joint measures for combating international terrorism and also aggression linked to drug trafficking, which constitute a direct threat to all the CIS States members. We shall enhance the effectiveness and coordination of the work conducted by security agencies and special services and provide effective support to the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre. We welcome steps to counteract the offensive waged by international terrorists, particularly such steps as the establishment of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian collective security region.

We confirm the readiness of the Commonwealth countries to participate actively in the efforts by the world community to establish a global security system capable of meeting new threats and challenges.

We view multilateral military and military-technical cooperation between interested States, including the strengthening of CIS Unified Anti-Air Defence System, as an important contribution to ensuring security.

We shall strive to bring about a speedy settlement by peaceful means of the armed conflicts in the territories of States members on the basis of the generally recognized norms and principles of international law, making full use of the Commonwealth's peacemaking potential. Duly recognizing the efforts by the Russian Federation, which has an important role in peacekeeping operations in the area of the CIS States, we intend to strive for a fairer distribution of the "peacemaking burden" in accordance with the obligations undertaken. We consider it necessary to systematize anti-crime cooperation on the part of the CIS countries, focusing it on combating organized crime, illegal drug and weapons trafficking, illegal migration, trafficking in persons and money-laundering.

We shall continue to give great attention to cooperation with regard to the observance of basic human rights and freedoms in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the documents of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

We note the need to expand and deepen cooperation in the humanitarian area within the CIS framework and in the areas of education, culture, science and the exchange of information, which ultimately will ensure the spiritual, moral and physical health of the rising generation. Maintaining and supporting the Russian language as the means of communication between nations is a general concern on the part of all countries interested in developing the integration processes within the CIS framework.

We consider the question of cooperation by inter-State associations situated in the Commonwealth area as a matter of particular importance for the future of CIS. In this context, it is important to ensure that such associations are open and mutually transparent.

We support the idea of the establishment within the Commonwealth of a legal area oriented towards international standards in the field of inter-State relations and in the sphere of mutual relations between the State and citizens.

We shall seek to establish an effective mechanism for carrying out decisions and agreements within the CIS framework, focusing on increasing the responsibility of the States members for carrying out the obligations that they have undertaken.

Confirming our commitment to the Commonwealth's dynamic development, we base our efforts on the will of the millions of people linked by centuries-old ties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Our peoples wish to see the Commonwealth as an area of stability, security, and harmony among nations, a region of stable political, economic, social and scientific and technical development that occupies a fitting place in the international community.

We, the heads of the CIS States members, are imbued with the determination to do everything possible to ensure that these aspirations become reality.